问题的核心: 以银行为主体的金融体系问题积累至总爆发. 这是这两次与其他经济衰退的本质区别. 其他次都是局部或具体事件引起 (如石油危机或IT泡沫破灭等). 而这两次是纯银行资本系统自身投机引起.
问题的起因: 美国联邦储备 (the FEDERAL RESERVE) 过度推动以信用为主体驱动的消费. 表相不同, 上次表面是为帮助英国从一战后恢复金本位 (Ref.0), 这次表面是为伊战买单. 具体操作手法也大异, 上次是炒作汽车产业 (Ref.1), 这次是炒作房地产业特别是次贷 (所以这次也比上次爆发更快更惨. 太多参考索引, 恕我不予摘录). 实质都纯为银行资本家集体的贪婪私利所驱动, 导致过度投机, 一方面信用消耗贻尽, 另一方面资产泡沫破灭, 从而崩溃了整个金融基础系统的正常运作. 上次的美国政府以及国会的监管失职尚可借口为没有先例, 无法理依据; 这次可纯是银行资本家们或其代理说客利诱政客们把1930年代后建立的法规给主动废弃掉 (Ref.2), 真是资本家的孝子贤孙政客.
政府或银行家的自救动作: 表面大异其趣, 上次表面似乎联邦储备毫无作为 (非不为也, 乃不能耳 Ref.0), 这次表面联邦储备似乎为大众利益倾全力而为, 实则都是大银行家借机免手续费支取大把国库(或国债)去救助贪婪无度而先毁人再伤己的银行投机资本家们自己 ( Ref1) -- 上次11亿(Ref.0, 那可是70年前, 经济规模小得多而美元价值高得多!), 这次大家都知道是7000亿 --, 而把真正需要信心救助的辛苦存钱的工薪个体锁死在即将下沉的船舱里保持平衡以便创造条件给资本逃生. 上次表面是联邦储备任由银行倒闭, 实则倒闭的都是无钱或未能加入联邦储备系统的弱小银行 (Ref3) – 恰恰是这些银行平常主要在为弱势个体服务. 这些自救动作的效果如何呢? 上次就不必说了. 这次到目前为止的效果是:
b. 其他行业 (如汽车) 的资本家们眼红口馋, 纷纷要求分一杯羹, 威胁说如果分不到就倒闭或裁员. 最后结果只怕就是"会哭的孩子有奶吃".
基于以上观察, 我大胆预测美国7000亿紧急救助最终效果将会是火上浇油, 不但无补于消费者信心重建, 无法稳定就业, 反倒会刺激通胀, 加速美元乃自全球货币的贬值, 导致全球萧条. 而且仍然会有弱小银行倒闭或被兼并, 因为其弱小, 在前面经济上升期他们赚钱时本就必需也更敢于冒更大风险, 虽然其运营成本比大银行低, 但总利润无法与强势大银行相比; 而在后面的经济衰退期, 小银行又会因为资金不足以保本度过较长时间而不得不冒险率先放贷, 虽然机遇与风险并存, 但总是冒着比大银行更大的风险, 新冒险能否成功既取决于眼光, 也依赖于经济何时复苏, 而这是谁都无法准确预测的, 特别是这次.
当然也并非一片绝望, 如果以下几点能发生, 我相信将能有助于缓解萧条 (只能缓解, 无法避免, 因大势已成, 无法短期逆转), 或者起码不至于社会大动荡:
奥巴马新政府改变紧急救助的用法, 不是去购买金融坏帐垃圾, 而用来担保个人和实体企业存款可保值兑付, 如果有银行要倒闭, 严加审查, 在确保资产不是被资本家转移或据为己有的条件下, 让其破产倒闭清算, 而政府担保将所有该行存款转至客户自由选择的其他银行. 这样有储蓄的个人可放心正常消费, 实体企业可照常运作. 不会发生纯因挤兑而导致小银行倒闭. 真正做到奖勤济弱, 鼓励理性投资抑制恶性投机的社会公义. 当然这只是构思, 具体操作程序需由专家制定再由国会审批.
彻底改革联邦储备体系: 或者彻底取消(私有)银行推选董事的制度, 或者所有董事任命必须由国会或地方议会审批; 取消联邦储备的盈利自我支撑模式(这是腐败或职责变质的根源. 三点水尚且懂得军队不可盈利, 否则指挥不灵. 这当初联邦储备制度的制定者怎会如此糊涂或幼稚, 抑或是难得糊涂? 有时候不得不畏惧资本的能耐. 中国今后的制度制定或改革希望能以此为鉴), 改由国会审批拨付运作费用; 限制其功能纯为独立中央银行, 监管银行系统而不是代表银行家利益. 负责避免任何合法银行纯因挤兑而导致倒闭.
恢复 Glass-Steagall_Act 之类的法规 (且另立法保证不可再将其取消), 杜绝今后再发生类似或更糟糕的金融投机.
否则真的除非中国能避免因大量失业而内乱, 依靠其强大的劳动生产力和宝贵的国民储蓄率带动全球经济避免恶性循环, 否则比上次大萧条更严重的大萧条将不可避免. (上次因为有二战正义最终胜利而打破人性恶性循环, 这次呢?)
Ref.0. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Depression#Causes
Scroll down to “Austrian School explanations” part:
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One reason for the monetary inflation was to help Great Britain, which, in the 1920s, was struggling with its plans to return to the gold standard at pre-war (World War I) parity. Returning to the gold standard at this rate meant that the British economy was facing deflationary pressure.
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... the Federal Reserve bought $1.1 billion of government securities from February to July 1932, raising its total holding to $1.8 billion. Total bank reserves rose by only $212 million, but Rothbard argues that this was because the American populace lost faith in the banking system and began hoarding more cash, a factor quite beyond the control of the Central Bank. The potential for a run on the banks caused local bankers to be more conservative in lending out their reserves, and this, Rothbard argues, was the cause of the Federal Reserve's inability to inflate.
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Ref. 1. http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/the-great-auto-industry-crisis-of-2008-history/
The Great Auto Industry Crisis of 2008: History
By menno
October 9, 2008 -
Doesn't the human race EVER learn? Why must we continually have to go through the same pains, trials and tribulations that our parents, grand parents and great grand parents went through? Same with the automobile industry. Same with how our nations handle their affairs– economics included. Even politics. Forever, politics.
1928: Times were “Terrific”. The “Roaring Twenties” they called them. After a short, sharp, 18 month long economic recession in 1920 - 1921, where the deadwood and dry brush was cleaned from the U.S. economy by an economic forest fire, new growth came along and prospered.
Even so, Chevrolet had come in at number one, selling 1,193,212 cars against Ford’s slow ramp-up of production of 607,592. Willys-Overland and sub-marque Whippet were third at 315k cars, with Hudson and sub-marque Essex at 282,203 following at number four. The total new vehicle market in the United States was 4,361,579.
Henry Ford finally listened to his son, Edsel, replacing the ubiquitous Model T “Flivver” with a new Model A car styled somewhat like a shrunken Lincoln. Yes, the great Henry Ford nearly destroyed his own nascent auto company with his stubborn demand that no change be made to what had been successful for so long. The Model T was his alter-ego, emphasis on ego. Finally, the market spoke and he at long last heard - at huge cost to his son who possibly alienated his father from that time on.
By August 1929, car sales dropped precipitously - even prior to the Great Depression which began on October 29. Even so, 1929 new vehicle sales amounted to 5,337,087. August car sales gave a warning that nobody heard.
1930 sales: 3,510,178 (a 34.2 percent drop year on year).
1931 sales: 2,472,359 (a 29.5 percent drop year on year)
1932 sales: 1,431,469 (a 42.1 percent drop year on year, a 73.2 percent reduction in sales compared to 1929. An auto market only a quarter the size of four years before).
1933 sales: up 38.7 percent year on year, to 1,447,018. (Still only about a third of the size of 1929).
1934 sales: up 45.5% year-on-year, to 2,669,963 (a 45.5% increase year-on-year). An auto market less than ½ the size of 1929.
The Great Depression dragged on until 1942, only interrupted by the great build-up of war materiel for America’s entry into World War II. Recently, only a year or so ago, people in charge of “The Fed” reluctantly admitted that the actions - or inactions - of their forbearers had not only caused, but exacerbated the Great Depression. “We’re sorry, we won’t do it again.”
So what are they doing now? Pretty much the same lever-pulling “never mind that man behind the curtain” antics that caused the ruination of the nation some 79 years ago. Throwing more paper money into a fire does nobody any good.
And things in 2008 are moving much faster than 1929. We have mountains of cash being thrown into a fire. The bail out with taxpayer money is for the sole “benefit” of the elite wealthy bankers.
Reminiscent of the Titanic, but instead of ladies and children getting the life-boats, it’s first class male bankers passengers, only, thank you - and the rest of you get locked into the hold to go down with the ship. Tough shit. We’re suddenly aware, as a people, that the politicians sworn to protect and “serve” us all have just locked us into a doomed ship and given the life rafts to others.
Are bank holidays next? Iceland’s economy has totally collapsed just within the last few days, the world’s economy is ever more interwoven. Messrs. Smoot and Hawley are ghosts now, but they are likely to begin haunting us again with protectionism rearing its head, further exacerbating the depth, length and longevity of the oncoming tsunami, just as happened in the 1930’s.
Much like our current “choices” between Presidential candidates, we can choose protectionism and certainly wreck our country, or choose a free market and watch it continue to be wrecked as it has been over the prior 40 years, when corporate managers began to decide to export jobs overseas in earnest. Is there a third way?
Yes. Ron Paul and others have been warning about the possibilities of all of this happening, and was ignored or received derision.
The underlying problem? As always, with humanity: a lack of morals. Corporate managers wanting more power and money at the expense of others. Union leaders and members wanting more power, money, less work and more influence at the expense of others. Politicians wanting more of everything and no accountability. Likewise bankers and financiers.
So how will this all affect Detroit, Inc? We’ll surmise about what might be happening very soon, in our next installment.
Ref.2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glass-Steagall_Act#Repeal_of_the_Act
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Repeal of the Act
See also Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act passed in 1980, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act deregulating the Savings and Loan industry in 1982, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.
The bill that ultimately repealed the Act was introduced in the Senate by Phil Gramm (R-TX) and in the House of Representatives by James Leach (R-IA) in 1999. The bills were passed by a 54-44 vote along party lines with Republican support in the Senate[8] and by a 343-86 vote in the House of Representatives[9]. Nov 4, 1999: After passing both the Senate and House the bill was moved to a conference committee to work out the differences between the Senate and House versions. The final bipartisan bill resolving the differences was passed in the Senate 90-8-1 and in the House: 362-57-15. Without forcing a veto vote, this bipartisan, veto proof legislation was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on November 12, 1999. [10]
The banking industry had been seeking the repeal of Glass-Steagall since at least the 1980s. In 1987 the Congressional Research Service prepared a report which explored the case for preserving Glass-Steagall and the case against preserving the act.[11]
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Ref.3. http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=59405
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… Before the creation of the Federal Reserve, Friedman and Schwartz noted, bank panics were typically handled by banks themselves – for example, through urban consortiums of private banks called clearinghouses. If a run on one or more banks in a city began, the clearinghouse might declare a suspension of payments, meaning that, temporarily, deposits would not be convertible into cash. Larger, stronger banks would then take the lead, first, in determining that the banks under attack were in fact fundamentally solvent, and second, in lending cash to those banks that needed to meet withdrawals. Though not an entirely satisfactory solution – the suspension of payments for several weeks was a significant hardship for the public – the system of suspension of payments usually prevented local banking panics from spreading or persisting. Large, solvent banks had an incentive to participate in curing panics because they knew that an unchecked panic might ultimately threaten their own deposits.
It was in large part to improve the management of banking panics that the Federal Reserve was created in 1913. However, as Friedman and Schwartz discuss in some detail, in the early 1930s the Federal Reserve did not serve that function. The problem within the Fed was largely doctrinal: Fed officials appeared to subscribe to Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon's infamous 'liquidationist' thesis, that weeding out "weak" banks was a harsh but necessary prerequisite to the recovery of the banking system. Moreover, most of the failing banks were small banks (as opposed to what we would now call money-center banks) and not members of the Federal Reserve System. Thus the Fed saw no particular need to try to stem the panics. At the same time, the large banks – which would have intervened before the founding of the Fed – felt that protecting their smaller brethren was no longer their responsibility. Indeed, since the large banks felt confident that the Fed would protect them if necessary, the weeding out of small competitors was a positive good, from their point of view.
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